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Abstract
There is a growing consensus in development economics suggesting that suc-
cessful economic policies feature a combination or succession of inward- and 
outward-oriented strategies. This article asks whether the Chinese government 
is pursuing such a mixed approach, which seeks to both harness opportuni-
ties from increased trade and investment and, at the same time, promote the 
development of domestic industries as well as import substitution. Following 
China's World Trade Organization accession, most export promotion meas-
ures became illegal. Policy makers were thus deprived of an effective tool for 
steering the international business activities of ﬁrms through administering 
incentive and control mechanisms. Their goal of promoting structural change 
in industries crippled by large overcapacity, low technology levels and low 
concentration ratios, was thus greatly complicated. Using the steel industry 
as an example, the article suggests that differentiated export steering contin-
ues to exist. It then goes on to ask under what conditions, in what ways and 
to what extent authorities are acting to harmonize ﬁrms' export behaviour 
with their long-term industrial development conceptions. The article ﬁnds 
that trade policy is not only product sensitive but dependent on technological 
sophistication, with high-tech products enjoying more favourable treatment. 
Keywords: trade policy, import substitution, export promotion, development econom-
ics, steel industry
Introduction
Import substitution (IS) and export promotion (EP) approaches are staples 
in the debate on proper industrial policy in development economics. The 
goal of both approaches is to stimulate economic activity, upgrade produc-
tion technology and ultimately, to increase living standards. To this end, 
both seek not only to augment the market for domestic manufactures but 
to accelerate its growth (Grabowski 1994). This, in turn, brings about static 
(economies of scale) and dynamic (learning curve effects) advantages that 
improve competitiveness and facilitate long-term growth. 
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Proponents of IS suggest the cultivation of a national industrial base 
behind protectionist barriers so that domestic manufactures gradually 
replace imports on the national market and self-sufﬁciency is achieved. 
As tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade shield the domestic market 
from import competition, an overvalued currency reduces the price 
of necessary capital goods imports. Governments then subsidize and 
organize the production of labour-intensive light industrial goods for 
ﬁnal consumption (ﬁrst round IS) or target capital-intensive heavy in-
dustry goods (second round IS). Similar to Rock (1994) and Grabowski 
(1994), most authors support the idea of a gradual shift towards more 
sophisticated goods over time.
Under IS, companies face strong incentives to serve domestic 
rather than international markets, leading some to associate IS with 
inward-oriented development strategies. Conceptually, IS was based 
on the structuralist postulate that a strong domestic industrial sector 
represents a necessary step on the economic development path. It was 
also inspired by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, which claims that 
developing countries were permanently locked into a state of under-
development because of weak (and deteriorating) terms of trade at the 
hands of exploitative industrialized countries that redrew trade rules 
to their advantage (Prebisch 1950; Singer 1950). In the ﬁrst decades 
following World War II, there was a 'general pessimism with respect 
to the potential of trade to promote rapid growth. Alternatively, there 
was general optimism with respect to the capabilities of the state to 
carry out effective development policy' (Grabowski 1994: 535). It was 
mostly Latin American governments that embarked on IS strategies 
to spark economic development and counterbalance the economic 
clout of the USA on the continent.1 In retrospect, the Latin American 
IS experiment has been labelled largely a failure due to welfare losses 
and the prevalence of low productivity levels. In the 1980s, slow de-
velopment progress and the failure to cultivate genuinely competitive 
infant industries led to the abandonment of IS and caused a reversal 
in policy orientation. Rodrik (2004) argues that while IS has produced 
some successes, it has also led to complacency, rent seeking and sub-
sidy addiction in government-sponsored industries, generating market 
failures rather than successes. 
 Over the years, the international political–economic environment was 
reshaped by rigid regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
reﬂect more closely the neoclassical ideal of liberal markets and discour-
age any deviations from national treatment policy.2 In their assistance to 
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developing countries that had gone into debt and payment crises over the 
1980s and 1990s, both the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund demanded the transition to market- and export-oriented policies 
as a precondition for emergency loans. While Robinson (2009) and Pack 
(2000) hold that IS strategies in East Asia have been more successful than 
in Latin America–due mainly to stronger government oversight and 
stricter punishment for underperforming ﬁrms–a World Bank Report 
(1993) concluded that IS produced inferior results compared to EP after 
evaluating industrial policy measures in eight Asian countries. 
Export-led or outward-looking policies began replacing inward-look-
ing ones in the late 1970s as optimism in states' ability to bring about 
development waned and conﬁdence in the functioning of markets 
increased (Hogendorn 1992: 486-497). The reasoning underlying EP 
was to increase welfare by reaping efﬁciency gains from (1) organizing 
international trade along the lines of nations' comparative advantages, 
(2) augmenting the relevant market and facilitating scale economies by 
creating incentive neutrality between domestic and export sales, as well 
as (3) restricting the development of monopolies and other non-com-
petitive market arrangements that thrive in protectionist environments 
(Krueger 1990: 288-292). Moreover, dynamic advantages are generated 
from knowledge spill-overs from increased exposure to foreign technolo-
gies and interaction with foreign counterparts. Furthermore, increased 
exports help generate the foreign exchange reserves necessary to import 
more advanced production equipment, which supports international 
competitiveness improving products and/or lowering costs.3 Addition-
ally, with regards to administrative guidance and performance-oriented 
support policies, outward-oriented strategies allow for a more objective 
evaluation of corporate competitiveness and achievements than IS, 
where performance has to be measured using less reliable indicators, 
such as domestic market penetration.
Today, there is general agreement that developing countries have 
good reason to resort to both IS and EP in their industrialization process; 
after all, both approaches aim at augmenting the market for (selected) 
domestic manufactures. As pointed out by Rock (1994: 19), 'virtually all 
the successful export-led industrializers began to export manufactures 
within the conﬁnes of a state-led ISI strategy'. Numerous authors, such 
as Krugman (1984), Kubo, DeMelo and Robinson (1986) and Rock (1994) 
argue that IS has to precede EP for the latter to be successful. Following 
this line of argument, Grabowski (1994) maintains that developing coun-
tries trying EP from the very beginning of their industrialization would 
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fail since their manufactures could not meet international standards in 
terms of cost, quality or performance. Instead, he suggests that an initial 
IS phase should serve to accumulate knowledge and investment in or-
der to improve product characteristics and boost competitiveness. This 
view, however, has increasingly become subject to criticism. Chu (1997) 
for example draws attention to the fact that East Asian economies that 
were widely cited for their successful industrial policies have practiced 
IS and EP approaches simultaneously and maintains that the distinction 
between the two concepts is misleading. 
Following the examples of South Korea and other late-industrializing 
countries in broad terms, the Chinese case may appear to conform to the 
established combination of IS and EP. However, I argue that Chinese for-
eign trade policy is more complex than a generalized IS-cum-EP concept 
would suggest. First, reviewing regulation governing the steel trade,4 
I ﬁnd policy measures to be sensitive to value-added and technology 
content. In this regard, I hold that China does not pursue a one-size-
ﬁts-all strategy but follows a path of selective, product-speciﬁc steering 
to integrate trade policy into the overall industrial policy framework. 
Second, taking up the example of the steel industry, I identify relevant 
policy tools and examine how their use has shifted over time to cater to 
a new international trade environment deﬁned by WTO regulations and 
the restrictive terms of China's accession agreement. Over the course 
of the article, I shed light on the various ways and means available to 
economic decision makers aiming to inﬂuence trade in ways conducive 
to an overarching industrial policy agenda. 
The next section will ﬁrst introduce the signiﬁcance of the steel in-
dustry to economic development in China and make the case that it is 
a worthy target for leveraging industrial policy. Second, it will provide 
an overview of the development dynamics of the Chinese steel industry 
and present the two hypotheses inspiring the research. Section three 
identiﬁes actual measures inﬂuencing exports and imports respectively. 
The concluding section will summarize the main ﬁndings, identify 
weaknesses of the current approach and point towards opportunities 
for further research.
Development Patterns of the Chinese Steel Industry
For much of China's post-World War II history, steel has been in short 
supply as reconstruction, rearmament, industrialization and later urban-
ization consumed large amounts of the material. Following the example 
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of the Soviet Union, China sought to kick-off its industrialization by 
developing heavy industry ﬁrst. As the young People's Republic (PRC) 
was a predominantly agrarian country with little industrial backbone, 
pursuing the Soviet model of heavy industry-led development required 
substantial cross-sectoral resource transfers. As Lin pointed out (2009), 
the development strategy underlying the ﬁrst ﬁve-year plans deﬁed 
China's comparative advantage, which, as a labour-abundant but capital-
scarce economy, would suggest a focus on light industry. The late 1950s 
even witnessed a nationwide mobilization of productive assets toward 
increasing steel output: the Great Leap Forward. More than any other 
event following the foundation of the PRC, the Great Leap Forward 
signiﬁed the strategic relevance of steel for national development, the 
political appreciation of this fact as well as the aspiration to control the 
steel industry by administrative means of the central command econo-
my. After the onset of the Cold War, international trade, investment and 
knowledge spill-overs had been limited to exchanges with the former 
Soviet Union which had supplied China with materials and aided in the 
construction of several large integrated steel plants, such as the Wuhan 
Steelworks (Nolan 2001). The Sino-Soviet split of the early 1960s ended 
this phase and left China politically and economically isolated. The 
continued political confrontations with foreign powers were reﬂected in 
economic strategy as the improvement of defence capabilities assumed 
priority. Steel, as a material highly relevant for warfare, was attributed 
strategic value, which removed the industry even further from the eco-
nomic rationality of free markets. The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) greatly interrupted the operation of the steel industry while 
the radicalized political environment complicated any interaction with 
the outside world (Nolan 2001). As the political environment of the pre-
reform era (1949-1978) had ruled out the EP approach, IS remained the 
sole option. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that due to the large 
size of its domestic market and frequent supply shortages, China did 
not face the limitations of narrow markets that existed in many Latin 
American countries and hence there did not exist an immediate need 
for export-led development in steel products.
After being cut off from the world market for a quarter of a century, the 
Chinese steel industry re-established international connections. At that 
point, it was not only too small to meet domestic demand but operating 
hopelessly outdated equipment and producing far below international 
quality standards (Nolan 2001). In the three decades that followed, the 
Chinese steel industry has witnessed remarkable growth and dramatic 
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improvements in production technology and product quality.5 Driven 
by burgeoning demand from nationwide urbanization and industri-
alization trends, output volumes skyrocketed. After surpassing Japan 
as the world's leading steel producer in 1996, volumes have continued 
to expand so that almost half of global steel output in 2012 took place 
in China (WSA, various years) (Figure 1).6 Due to space restraints, this 
article focuses on the period after China's accession to the WTO in 
2001, as this event marked an important step in the reintegration of the 
Chinese steel industry into the world market. Future research should 
expand the scope to the ﬁrst part of the reform era.
Chinese trade policy for the steel sector is oriented along the lines of 
four 'fundamental principles'. First, companies are urged to draft their 
strategies to target 'two markets and two resources' as a source of ad-
vantage. A common expression in Chinese policy documents, it urges 
ﬁrms to seize opportunities from leveraging procurement and sales 
both on the home market and abroad (NDRC 2005). Second, meeting 
domestic demand for steel products takes priority. Third, direct steel 
exports should be optimized, meaning that exporters should abandon 
resource-intensive, polluting, low-end goods and focus more on tech-
nology-intensive, high-value-added products. Finally, indirect exports 
should be expanded, indicating that the rising steel demand by export-
oriented manufacturing industries should be satisﬁed, to indirectly 
expand steel exports (MIIT 2009).
I present two hypotheses that seek to deepen the understanding 
of trade policies related to steel products. Since it has started to look 
questionable whether China is pursuing an integrative approach com-
FIGURE 1: Chinese Annual Crude Steel Output since 1949
Source: World Steel Association (2012)
_________________________________________________________________________35
_______________________________________________ China's Trade in Steel Products
bining inward-and outward-looking elements, this issue drives the 
ﬁrst hypothesis. From its inception, the development of the Chinese 
steel industry was heavily inﬂuenced by both inward-oriented poli-
cies, characterized by IS, and outward-oriented policies, aiming at EP. 
IS industrialization had been practiced for many years before China's 
accession to the WTO, at which point the local steel industry was still in 
a fairly weak position, crippled by low technological expertise and low 
quality standards. Considering that the bulk of the mills were conﬁned 
to making low-and mid-range products by their production technology, 
it would seem reasonable to restrict imports in the upper market seg-
ments. According to the established logic of IS, such an approach would 
curb supply, drive up price levels and thereby strengthen incentives for 
companies to update their production technologies and upgrade their 
product portfolios. The higher proﬁtability associated with high-grade 
products would have attracted additional investments and accelerated 
industry-wide upgrading processes. Furthermore, the strong export 
performance of the Chinese steel industry in the pre-crisis years sug-
gests the existence of export management on the part of government 
authorities.
H1: Chinese foreign trade policy with regard to steel products relies on both 
import substitution and export management.
Since industrial policy for the steel sector displays a strong orientation 
towards fostering technological upgrading (NDRC 2005; MIIT 2009), 
it stands to reason that corresponding regulation exists in documents 
governing international trade ﬂows. One major aim of the analysis is to 
ﬁnd proof that trade policies share the same commitment to technology 
as domestically oriented ones. Consequently, the second hypothesis is 
as follows:
H2: Chinese foreign trade policy with regard to steel products is not uniform 
but crafted in favour of high-value-added, technology-intensive product 
categories.
The objective measurement of technical sophistication or technology 
intensity is difﬁcult and bound to be misleading around the edges. Due 
to space restraints, here I will not make an attempt at conducting my 
own analysis but rely on a categorization of products by the China Iron 
and Steel Association (CISA), China's leading industry association for 
the steel sector, currently covering the 67 leading steelmakers and more 
than 80 per cent of annual crude steel output (Mysteel 2011). Accord-
ing to CISA, technology-intensive products include: cold rolled thin 
and wide strip/sheet, coated or clad sheet, electrical sheet and various 
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kinds of alloy steel. As for the low-tech segment, this article will focus 
on basic long products, e.g. rebar, and ﬂat products, e.g. hot rolled strip, 
made of carbon steel without special surface treatment such as coating 
or plating (Shan 2010; Zhang 2008).
Regulation of the Steel Trade
Patterns of Foreign Trade in Steel Products
Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has emerged as a leading player 
in the international steel trade. The rapid increase in both inbound and 
outbound shipments was brought to a near halt by the global ﬁnancial 
crisis. For ﬁve years between 2002 and 2012, China could claim the title 
as the world's largest exporter of steel products (World Steel Association 
2012). Since its WTO accession, China has maintained a share of 12 to 15 
per cent in overseas traded steel products in value terms. Over the same 
timeframe, export volumes never accounted for more than 12 per cent 
of domestic output (WSA 2012).7 On the other hand, import quantities 
have dropped substantially since 2003. However, because the average 
price per ton of inbound shipments has registered a series of increases, 
the total import value did not drop. This phenomenon reﬂects a shift 
towards imports of higher added value.8 As the average sophistica-
tion–and price per ton–of export shipments did not increase at the same 
pace, a signiﬁcant gap has formed between average import and export 
quotations (see Figure 2). A pronounced discrepancy in the composi-
tion of inbound and outbound trade continues to exist as imports are 
still made up of technology-intensive wares, such as electrical steel or 
galvanized sheet, while exports consist of medium-grade products, such 
as hot rolled sheet or section steel (Shan 2010).
By joining the WTO, the Chinese government has accepted far-reach-
ing constraints on industrial policy prohibiting subsidies to support in-
dividual companies, the micro-management of state-owned enterprises 
as well as certain IS and EP measures. As shown earlier, Chinese steel 
exports did not experience a major slump but, on the contrary, realized 
a stellar performance in the years following. Industrial policy makers 
on the other hand, have suffered a setback since they were deprived of 
effective tools for steering the international business activities of steel 
mills. Their attempts to promote structural change in an industry crip-
pled by signiﬁcant overcapacity, low technology levels and low con-
centration ratios, was greatly complicated (NDRC 2005; MIIT 2009). If 
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FIGURE 2: Chinese Foreign Trade in Steel Products in Volume and 
Value Terms
Source: General Administration of Customs (2012)
WTO regulations are interpreted as giving completely free rein to market 
forces, this does not hold much promise for domestic upgrading and 
export control efforts. Opening the pressure valve for surplus produc-
tion, particularly at the low end of the product spectrum, would have 
undermined Chinese development strategies (and depressed interna-
tional steel markets as well). Chinese authorities were thus faced with 
the difﬁcult decision to either continue using the foreign trade channel 
for their developmentalist agenda or to give up control and incentive 
mechanisms and switch to a neutral stance.
As will be shown below, government actors, recognizing the inﬂuence 
of steelmaking on overall economic development and loath to forfeit 
control of foreign trade ﬂows, have opted for a mixed approach. While 
major programmes originating in the pre-WTO era were discontinued 
as a concession to the changed regulatory environment, authorities have 
been and still are dedicating substantial resources to monitoring and man-
aging the global market interface. Simple calls for limiting imports and 
promoting exports (SETC 2001a) that were the staple of policy documents 
of the pre-WTO era have become increasingly rare in recent years.
Import Substitution
Over the past decades, government agencies on various levels have 
undertaken major efforts to ensure that China could reach self-suf-
ﬁciency in steel both in terms of quality and quantity. Until the early 
1990s, steelmakers received assistance to ramp up production volumes. 
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Then the focus shifted towards improving quality and upgrading tech-
nology. Government patronage in the form of direct subsidies, policy 
loans, tax beneﬁts or preferential access to vital inputs, energy, water, 
transportation infrastructure, etc. have undoubtedly helped to realize 
the spectacular expansion of steelmaking operations that has gradually 
displaced imports (Taube and in der Heiden 2010). The Development 
Programme for the Iron and Steel Industry during the 12th Five-Year 
Programme clearly demands that companies signiﬁcantly improve 
product quality to meet the demand of major downstream industries 
and key national construction projects. Mass production should be real-
ized in product segments with relatively high import shares, e.g. high-
strength high-toughness steel for cars and various types of silicon steel, 
to achieve self-sufﬁciency ratios in excess of 90 per cent. In the ﬁelds 
of corrosion-resistant steel for shipbuilding, sheet for low-temperature 
pressure vessels, steel for wheels and bearings for high-speed trains, 
tubes for high-pressure boilers and other high-value-added products, 
80 per cent of market demand should be satisﬁed from Chinese sources 
(MIIT 2011: 3.3.1).
Table 1 in the Appendix shows that IS has been largely achieved in 
almost all broad product categories. It is obvious that the reliance on 
imports has consistently been negligible in the low-tech categories, such 
as rod, bar and section products. As discussed earlier, capacity expan-
sion took hold ﬁrst and progressed fastest in the basic low-value-added 
segments. Three reasons can be identiﬁed to explain why these goods 
constitute a logical starting point for IS: (1) they are rather unsophisti-
cated and thus easy to make; (2) they sell at comparatively low average 
prices per ton. In the case of imports, this implies that a fairly large trans-
portation and tariff cost component would have to be added on top of 
a fairly low sales price; and (3) demand volumes for these products are 
exceptionally large in China, with most orders coming from the construc-
tion industry. Consequently, in terms of sales volume, these products 
have long constituted the largest individual market segments from the 
early days of steel development in China until the present day. 
Noticeable is the marked reduction in the import penetration in coated 
sheet and electric sheet. Still these two technology-intensive areas have 
the largest gap between domestic demand and production capabilities. 
It is remarkable that self-sufﬁciency in cold rolled thin sheet and coated 
sheet was expanded over the last ﬁve years. These products are widely 
used in downstream manufacturing, such as the motor vehicles and 
household appliances industries, which have registered dynamic out-
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put increases over the same time. Motor vehicles are up 150 per cent, 
refrigerators, 75 per cent and washing machines, 106 per cent (NBS, 
various years). 
After establishing that a certain degree of IS in steel should be re-
garded as a necessary condition to support national development, I 
now turn to analyse IS policies in the larger context of technological 
upgrading. The two objectives of technological upgrading and IS were 
major elements of China's industrial policy for the steel industry and 
went hand in hand before the country's WTO accession. In the 1980s, 
ill-equipped and unable to meet the quality demands of its customers, 
Chinese steelmakers were slow to prevent strong import dependence 
in many high-value-added product categories. Government agencies 
reacted with normative calls and practical measures to remedy this situ-
ation. As such, the substitution of imported steel products was actively 
pursued before China's WTO accession. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government set up dedi-
cated steel companies to reduce import penetration for speciﬁc prod-
ucts it deemed important for national development. One such example 
was the shortage of high quality seamless pipes with applications in oil 
well drilling and pipeline construction that inspired the foundation of 
Tianjin Pipe Group Corporation. The pronounced import dependence 
was considered an obstacle to the development of China's ﬂedgling 
petroleum industry. Hence the strategic decision was made to set up a 
local pipe supplier.9 To achieve self-sufﬁciency in this product segment, 
the establishment of Tianjin Pipe was designated a key project in the 8th 
Five-Year-Plan. The goal was met and the reliance on imports dropped 
sharply, from 90 per cent in 1993, the year before Tianjin Pipe began 
operating, to about 20 per cent in 2004. Today, Tianjin Steel Pipe Group, 
located in Tianjin's Economic and Technological Development Area, is a 
leading supplier of corrosion-resistant steel pipes, both to the domestic 
and the international market (Dewey and LeBoeuf 2007: 58).
In 1987, a steel import substitution policy10 was introduced to 
encourage major export-oriented downstream industries, such as 
machinery, automotives and appliances, to replace steel imports with 
domestically sourced materials. Strong growth in these sectors had 
driven up demand for high-value-added, high-quality steel products, 
which had to be supplied from the world market. Aiming to stimulate 
the modernization of the steel sector, the government seized this op-
portunity to promote modernization in the small, high-end-segment of 
the steel market. A few dozen large state-owned steel producers were 
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selected to participate in a programme that refunded the full 17 per 
cent of value added tax (VAT) paid on domestic sales, once the ﬁnal 
goods containing the steel products were exported. Thanks to these 
special VAT rebates, mills could lower their prices and expand their 
market shares in the important mid- to high-end product segment. In 
this way, companies like Baosteel managed to step up their production 
of stainless steel, hot-dipped galvanized sheets and other technology-
intensive steel products widely used in the production of goods sold 
in the global market (Dewey and LeBoeuf 2007).
According to the State Bureau of Metallurgical Industry, 27 steelmak-
ers participated in the Import Substitution Programme in 1999. Under 
the terms of the programme, these companies delivered 3 million tons 
of steel to the export manufacturing industry (Asia Pulse 2010). Fol-
lowing China's WTO accession, the programme was scaled back since 
it was not only in violation of WTO regulations but had also become 
obsolete considering the rapid development of the domestic steel in-
dustry. When the IS scheme was ﬁnally abolished in July 2005, basic 
self-sufﬁciency had been achieved across most product categories. It 
was reported that the programme had successfully substituted Chinese 
steel for imports and absorbed an estimated 30 million tons of domestic 
steel production. In total, the companies entitled to participate in the 
scheme had beneﬁted from a combined tax exemption of RMB 12 bil-
lion. Statistics indicate that the import share of domestically consumed 
steel declined substantially while the policy was in place. In this way it 
looks to have brought about a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to Chinese steel mills 
(Dewey and LeBoeuf 2007).
In another attempt to enlarge the market shares of domestic mills 
vis-à-vis import competition, the Programme for Industrial Structural 
Adjustment during the 10th Five-Year Plan, released in 2001 as a sup-
plement to the 10th Five-Year Plan, calls for an active IS strategy. The 
programme spells out in detail the central government's vision for the 
future development of several industrial sectors, including the steel 
industry. In the section titled 'Guiding Thoughts and Basic Principles', 
the programme urges steelmakers to develop the relatively large 
number of technology-intensive, high-value-added products that thus 
far had to be imported and increase their market shares in these areas 
(SETC 2001b). At the time, most Chinese steel mills did not possess 
the advanced technologies and production expertise to comply. Con-
sequently, the programme called for more international cooperation 
to tap modern technology and speed up development. Consequently, 
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Chinese companies were encouraged to utilize foreign funds, resources, 
technologies and scientiﬁc management experience to strengthen their 
competitiveness (SETC 2001b).
As late as 1999, the central government enforced an import ban on 
steel products that could be produced inside China. Additionally, total 
imports were limited to a mere 7 million tons. Furthermore, imports were 
governed by an import licensing programme and substantial import 
tariffs (SETC 1999). Regulations in Hebei Province, China's steel produc-
tion heartland, continued to prohibit imports of products that could be 
made locally until the country's WTO entry (Hebei Province 2000).
The three programmes presented here are proof of the government's 
determination to improve technological capabilities at local mills to 
drive up their market shares and reduce import dependence in steel. 
After 2001, formal programmes were either discontinued or scaled back 
to meet WTO obligations that demanded the termination of subsidies 
linked to the use of domestic over imported goods (WTO n.d.: Art. 3). 
With regard to IS, the regulations also stipulate that import approvals 
must not be connected to the existence of domestic suppliers and that 
no speciﬁc performance requirements can be maintained. At the same 
time, calls for domestic companies to improve their market position 
in the face of foreign competition both at home and abroad remain 
frequent and explicit.
Even though calls from the central government agencies to strengthen 
IS have stopped in recent years, documents of several provincial and 
local governments indicate that they remain in favour of this approach. 
Shandong Province is a case in point. Provincial authorities formally 
asked companies to upgrade their product portfolio to better meet the 
steel demand of several industries, such as the automotive, home appli-
ance, shipping container, construction and equipment manufacturing 
industries. In a ﬁrst step, enterprises should focus their efforts on the 
development of high-grade hot rolled thin sheet, cold rolled thin sheet, 
galvanized sheet, colour coated sheet and other products needed in the 
market. In general, mills should strive to replace imports where domestic 
production falls short of meeting demand (Shandong Province 2006). 
Three years later, in 2009, Shandong Province again endorsed IS in its 
2009 Adjustment and Revitalization Programme for the Iron and Steel 
Industry. A passage encouraging companies to enhance their innovative-
ness, accelerate the introduction of advanced technologies and increase 
technology content particularly invites companies to focus attention on 
key steel products in order to supplant imports.
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References to IS need not be limited to indicative calls but may also 
affect actual projects. This can be demonstrated in the case of Hanzhong 
Steel, located in Shaanxi Province. In the spring of 2005, provincial authori-
ties gave the green light for an extensive technology renovation project the 
company was planning. Founded during the 4th Five-Year Plan period 
and reaching an annual crude steel capacity of 1.5 million tons by the time 
it ﬁled its application documents in 2005, the company urgently needed to 
upgrade its production processes. In its approval statement, the provincial 
development and reform commission elaborated that the construction 
of a planned rolling mill for certain ﬂat products should serve to reduce 
imports by 1.5 million tons annually (Shaanxi Province 2005).
CISA continues to voice support for displacing imports by domestic 
production. In February 2008, its chairman, Zhang Xiaogang (CISA n.d. 
(b)) urged companies to actively promote the replacement of imports by 
domestic production (Zhang 2008). In February of 2009, while speak-
ing at a CISA conference, he reiterated his remarks, ﬁrmly endorsing 
IS (Zhang 2009). In February 2010, CISA chairman Deng Qilin (CISA 
n.d. (a)) called upon steel companies to promote product development 
in order to (1) meet urgent demand from national key development 
projects, (2) satisfy the demand of downstream industries to support 
growing exports and (3) to displace imports of like products wherever 
possible (Deng 2010). Overall, it seems that the rather blunt language of 
the past has been replaced by far more speciﬁc statements. As recently 
as July 2010, Shan Shanghua, secretary general of CISA, demanded that 
research activities relating to the manufacturing of corrosion-resistant, 
high-strength steel plate for application in oil tankers should be intensi-
ﬁed to break the monopoly of foreign suppliers. Furthermore, Chinese 
steel mills should strive to displace imports of heavy plate used in the 
manufacturing of equipment for hydropower stations with domestically 
produced materials (Shan 2010; CISA 2010). In a press statement issued 
by CISA earlier the same year, the organization praised Baosteel and 
Wuhan Steel for their innovativeness and research breakthroughs that 
led to proprietary intellectual property rights relating to high-grade, 
grain-oriented silicon steel commonly used for making large-scale super-
high-pressure transformers of 500 kilovolts and more. Both companies 
were commended for their efforts to expand production volumes to 
replace imports of like products (CISA 2010).
While these appeals have no binding effect and are purely indicative 
in nature, they communicate to steel companies and the wider public 
that IS continues to be desirable. Besides praising successful cases of 
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import displacements, CISA also found more concrete ways by which 
to guide individual companies to contribute to IS. In this regard, CISA 
is distributing information concerning steel imports to its member com-
panies, which include the 67 largest and most advanced steel mills from 
across the country. According to CISA's own announcement, the reports 
disseminated on a regular basis contain information on product types, 
quality speciﬁcations and trade ﬂows that may serve as a guideline for 
companies (Deng 2010).
Trade Measures Targeting Exports
In reviewing the instruments applied by Chinese government agencies to 
inﬂuence export patterns, it is necessary to distinguish between measures 
restraining and promoting exports. While Chinese industrial policy mak-
ers have a large arsenal of export-restricting tools at their disposal, this 
paper will only present those instruments that have been employed in 
governing steel exports. I ﬁrst introduce the measures by giving a brief 
outline of their operating mechanism. Next their relevance and contribu-
tion to the implementation of industrial policy will be presented. 
Export restrictions
Since the beginning of the reform era, the Chinese government has 
reserved the right to supervise and inﬂuence the magnitude and com-
position of the ﬂow of goods leaving the country. In der Heiden and 
Taube (2011) have outlined in detail some of the instruments employed 
to curb the exportation of steel-relevant raw materials and semi-ﬁnished 
products. They have illustrated that central ministries and commissions, 
with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), the General Administration of Customs (GAC) and 
the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) as key players, are actively 
managing the regulatory environment that shapes companies' incentives 
to export. In the case of steel-relevant commodities, a major rationale for 
export barriers was the bottling up of materials in the domestic market. 
The resulting oversupply, combined with the undersupply in overseas 
markets, opened a price gap that provided a cost advantage to Chinese 
downstream producers vis-à-vis the foreign competition. Furthermore, 
this practice supported the policy objectives of streamlining industry 
structure, upgrading production technologies and improving envi-
ronmental performance by pushing small, polluting and low-quality 
producers out of business. 
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Export licenses, quotas and duties are the most important instruments 
in the government's toolbox and have been employed to direct ship-
ments according to policy priorities and macroeconomic situations. In 
der Heiden and Taube (2011) have shown that export restrictions have 
been tightened as authorities have tried to curb the outﬂow of resource-
intensive and polluting products. In a ﬂexible reaction to changing 
circumstances, authorities relaxed–if not reversed–export restrictions 
during the economic downturn following the global ﬁnancial crisis so 
as to accommodate ailing steelmakers.
Hot rolled strip exports were ﬁrst subjected to restrictions in the form 
of export duties in May 2007. Following the stepwise reduction and 
eventual abolition of VAT rebates, authorities imposed a 5 per cent tax on 
exports. In all, the elimination of VAT rebates initially set at 13 per cent 
and the introduction of export duties reduced export margins by 18 per 
cent with a depressing effect on exports volumes. As in the case of VAT 
rebates described earlier, the government's stance on exports became 
more favourable in the face of the world economic crisis: export duties 
were scrapped in December 2008 to ease the burden on export trade.
Export promotion
In the process of reviewing a sizable number of ofﬁcial documents 
governing foreign trade, several EP programmes were identiﬁed. In 
its 'New and Full Subsidy Notiﬁcation' to the WTO (2006), the Chinese 
government made no mention of programmes administered by local 
governments or privileged treatment by ﬁnancial institutions. In reply 
to criticism from several of its trading partners, the authorities have 
stated that insufﬁcient information was available to provide complete 
information on local programmes (WTO, various years). While this may 
or may not be the case, the fact remains that due to a lack of transpar-
ency, it is difﬁcult to identify export subsidy schemes administered by 
lower levels of government. Such programmes are maintained based 
on internal administrative measures and relevant information is likely 
not publicized.
In an attempt to ease the promotion of technology-intensive products 
of various industries, in 2000 the Chinese government compiled two lists 
to classify technology-intensive products. The ﬁrst list, the Catalogue 
of High and New Technology Products, targeted the domestic market 
and was intended to speed up the development of high-tech industries, 
encourage the creation of high-tech products, direct investments towards 
high-tech activities and increase the competitiveness of domestic high-
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tech products. It contained several steel products, such as high-speed 
heavy rail, large H-section and anti-ﬁngerprint galvanized sheet. The 
second list, designated Catalogue of High and New Technology Prod-
ucts for Export contained a separate set of technically sophisticated 
products and served as the basis for EP measures, helping authorities to 
manage, upgrade and expand high-tech exports (MOFTEC et al. 2000). 
In 2003 and 2006, the latter catalogue was expanded and numerous steel 
products were added. The most recent version, which was still in force at 
the time of writing in June 2011, heavily features coated products, such 
as tinplate and galvanized sheet in various dimensions. The catalogue 
also lists stainless steel sheet, alloy steel products and special steels, 
such as gear steel and spring steel (MOFTEC et al. 2006).
Comparing the two catalogues, there is little overlap except in coated 
products. The fact that the steel products contained in both catalogues 
differ does not necessarily contradict the idea that foreign trade related 
policy measures are in sync with an overarching industrial restructur-
ing framework since different patterns of demand and competition 
may dictate the promotion of different kinds of high-value-added steel 
products at home and abroad. It can thus be argued that the promo-
tion of high-tech exports is considered an end in itself and pursued 
independently from general efforts to upgrade the product portfolios 
of Chinese ﬁrms. However, in late 2009, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology announced its intention to merge the two catalogues to end 
the dichotomy (MOST 2009).
In 2005, eight central ministries and administrations jointly launched 
a programme to build up and promote famous export brands. This 
decision was inspired by the strong promotion effect developed country 
brands have on the success of their international sales, not least in China, 
and based on the experience of Chinese exporting companies. While Chi-
nese branded products had become successful in the domestic market, 
almost none were known outside China when the programme was drafted 
in 2004. Furthermore, relatively low quality levels, weak innovative ca-
pacity and the absence of established brands had been found to impede 
export performance. Consequently, establishing the 'Key Export Brands 
to be Cultivated and Developed by the Ministry of Commerce' (hereafter 
referred to as export brands) set out to support Chinese companies in ex-
ploring international markets and expanding exports through the building 
up of famous exports brands (MOFCOM et al. 2005). To achieve this aim, 
the initiating document introduced a comprehensive set of preferential 
policy measures, several of which are discussed brieﬂy below. Because 
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the document does not target speciﬁc industries but looks at Chinese 
exports from a very broad perspective, not all of the measures listed are 
applicable to steel mills. Consequently, the focus will be narrowed down 
to cite measures applicable for the steel sector. 
Exporters participating in the pilot programme were encouraged and 
supported to upgrade their technologies and innovative capacities, to 
improve their international marketing abilities and to expand exports of 
products with their own export brands. It was envisioned that over the 
ﬁve years (until 2010), the share of exporting companies with proprietary 
brands and the proportion of exports with proprietary brands should 
both double from their 2005 levels to reach 40 per cent and 20 per cent 
respectively (MOFCOM et al. 2005). While all exporting companies were 
encouraged to meet the basic preconditions for managing proprietary 
brands by, for example, registering trademarks overseas, undergoing 
quality and environmental certiﬁcation or setting up international sales 
networks and after sales services, a small number of major companies 
were chosen for the formation of successful export brands in a signature 
project. The 'Export Brand Development Fund' was set up speciﬁcally 
to support enterprises in the formation of proprietary brands and the 
development of famous export brands (MOFCOM et al. 2005). 
Companies selected for participation could beneﬁt from numerous 
advantages. They were: (1) granted preferential allocation of import and 
export quotas; (2) preferred in government procurement activities in all 
areas and at all levels of public administration; (3) supported in enhanc-
ing research and development activities and improving innovative capa-
bilities; (4) assisted in the procurement of advanced technology and key 
equipment; (5) helped to continuously increase technology content and 
value added of famous export brand products; (6) granted preferential 
access to subsidized loans from both the Technology Renovation Project 
and the Research and Development Fund for Export Products; (7) sup-
ported in the establishment of state-level technology centres; (8) given 
access to the Foreign Trade Development Fund; and (9) encouraged to 
present themselves at domestic and international trade fairs, conduct 
advertising in overseas target markets and establish overseas operations 
for marketing and after sales services (MOFCOM et al. 2005).
Furthermore, the Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine gives priority to the exemption of famous export brands 
from inspection if companies can meet certain conditions. The General 
Administration of Customs provides a channel to ease and speed up 
customs procedures. Banks and insurance companies are encouraged 
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by the government to ease access to ﬁnancing and insurance services. 
The China Export Credit Insurance Company is encouraged to treat 
famous export brand companies as 'key clients', develop customized 
service offerings to cater to their individual needs, grant discounts on 
relevant fees and give priority to providing value-added services. Chi-
nese embassies and consulates overseas should provide further support 
by conducting research on industries and markets and communicating 
relevant information to famous export brand companies. If one of these 
ﬁrms plans to launch sales in a particular foreign market, local embassies 
and consulates should offer guidance and help. They should also seize 
every opportunity to promote the famous export brand.
Considering the comprehensive nature of this programme, we can 
expect that participating companies may beneﬁt substantially. Like all 
the EP measures presented here, the 'famous export brand' policy has 
a strong bias towards technology-intensive products and could thus 
serve to advance upgrading in the steel industry in accordance with 
general industrial policy. Research has revealed that at least one steel 
mill, Tianjin Steel Pipe Company, has been accepted into the national 
programme (MOFCOM 2005a). At this stage it is not possible to de-
termine how successful attempts at establishing famous export brands 
have been.
The initiating document of the Famous Export Brand programme 
speciﬁcally called for lower level governments to implement similar 
programmes and launch their own famous export brands. The city of 
Ma'anshan, located in Anhui Province and home to Ma'anshan Iron 
and Steel Group, one of China's largest steelmakers, is such a case. 
As late as July 2008, the municipal government released the initiating 
document for the local version of the famous export brand programme. 
While the document largely echoes the original text drafted at the cen-
tral government level, citing the same motivations and expressing the 
same expectations, the scope of support measures announced is smaller. 
The assistance measures to be mobilized by local authorities, however, 
include a one-time cash reward and ﬁscal support channelled through a 
special fund to create famous export brands. Authorities have pledged 
assistance to companies pursuing activities such as applying for inter-
national certiﬁcations, trademark registrations, marketing campaigns 
or participation in Chinese and overseas trade fairs. Since technological 
upgrading plays a major role in the programme's concept, with regard 
to the procurement of advanced technologies and equipment, the 
government of Ma'anshan promises to endorse applications of local 
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projects to support funds administered at the provincial or national 
level. In the same vein, companies admitted into the local programme 
will be recommended for acceptance into the provincial and national 
programmes. Ma'anshan Iron and Steel Group, one of China's leading 
steelmakers with 17.2 million tons of crude steel output in 2012, was 
among the ﬁrst six companies accepted into the programme in the 
ﬁrst selection round (Ma'anshan City 2008). After the regular two-year 
participation period had expired at the end of 2010, the company was 
re-admitted for another two years. In this way, Ma'anshan Iron and 
Steel Group was eligible for the support measures until the end of 2012 
(Ma'anshan City 2011).
The Chinese government has sought to offset negative effects of the 
domestic VAT to exporters. As in der Heiden and Taube (2011) have 
illustrated, VAT rebates have been provided selectively on certain prod-
uct groups and in line with general industrial policy. Complementing 
export restriction measures, VAT rebates were eliminated for low-value-
added, polluting or resource-intensive goods. On the other hand, they 
were maintained or raised for technology-intensive, high-value-added 
products. In der Heiden and Taube (2011) have shown that VAT rebates 
are frequently adjusted to support industrial policy objectives–namely 
enhancing/diminishing the international competitiveness of goods en-
dorsed/discouraged by government authorities–but also serve to shore 
up exports as a whole in the face of demand shocks. Finally, the tool was 
determined to be employed to accommodate the demands of foreign 
trade groups clamouring for defensive action from their governments 
against a ﬂood of Chinese imports.
Furthermore, the provision of export insurance by the state-owned 
China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) may be 
regarded as an additional mechanism creating export incentives by 
lowering the risks associated with international sales. Sinosure, estab-
lished in late 2001, is the ofﬁcial export and credit insurance company 
in China and has a service network covering the whole country. In 2008, 
the last year for which data is available, the sum insured totalled USD 
62.8 billion and covered 3.4 per cent of Chinese exports. According to 
its ofﬁcial website: 
Sinosure is mandated, in accordance with the Chinese government's 
diplomatic, international trade, industrial, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial policies, to 
promote Chinese exports and investments, especially exports of high-tech or 
high value-added capital goods, by means of offering export credit insurance 
against non-payment risks, and providing services in ﬁnancing, information 
and receivables management. (Sinosure 2011)
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As stated in its company proﬁle, Sinosure's mission is to promote the 
export of Chinese goods, ﬁrst and foremost in the high-value-added and 
high-tech segment, in accordance with government policies including 
industrial policy. In its 2008 annual report, Sinosure claims to support 
the development of key industries, contribute to the upgrade of trade 
and focus on promoting exports of high- and new-tech products as 
deﬁned by the Chinese in the Catalogue of Chinese High-tech Export 
Products (Sinosure 2009). With regard to the steel industry, Sinosure has 
conﬁrmed that black metal smelting and rolling processing are among 
a set of twenty industries serviced. In a nutshell, there is little doubt 
that Sinosure serves to support the implementation of industrial policy 
objectives speciﬁcally by assuming commercial export credit risks and 
thus facilitating high-tech exports (WTO 2008).
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the MOF have estab-
lished the Export Credit Insurance Assistance and Development 
Fund to improve access to and reduce the costs of insurance services 
(MOFCOM 2005b). In 2006, both ministries called (1) to further enhance 
the effectiveness of the programme, (2) to widely distribute informa-
tion concerning its beneﬁts, (3) to motivate more enterprises to take 
advantage of preferential terms and (4) to ﬁnd and solve problems in 
its implementation (MOFCOM and MOF 2006). Provincial authorities 
have also made use of the programme to stimulate local export activities. 
In Jiangsu Province, the scheme is jointly operated by the department 
of ﬁnance, the economic and trade department and the Jiangsu branch 
of Sinosure acting as a co-organizer. According to an ofﬁcial state-
ment, the Nanjing branch of Sinosure reports accepted projects to the 
provincial government twice a year. This should serve as an indication 
of the close relationship between public administration and Sinosure's 
local business units (Jiangsu Province 2003). As a result, export credit 
insurance fees are heavily subsidized: enterprises associated with the 
provincial government are even entitled to a 50 per cent discount and 
provincial authorities have urged lower administrative levels to take 
corresponding measures in their jurisdictions (Jiangsu Province 2003). 
In 2006, the discount on insurance fees for exporting ﬁrms associated 
with the provincial government of Jiangsu was reduced to 30 per cent. 
However, this discount could be increased by an additional 10 per cent 
if exports were destined for emerging markets.11
As pointed out earlier, Sinosure's services are also an important com-
ponent of the comprehensive support package for companies taking 
part in the Famous Export Brands programme. In order to best integrate 
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Sinosure into government dealings with supported companies, effective 
coordination mechanisms have been established on all administrative 
levels. These mechanisms then allow Sinosure to facilitate contact with 
target companies in the programme, collect information on their indi-
vidual needs and explore how export credit insurance could contribute to 
their development. In Jiangsu Province, the departments of ﬁnance and 
foreign trade and economic cooperation jointly work out speciﬁc policy 
measures to best apply export credit insurance support to individual 
companies. This implies that Sinosure's insurance fees are subsidized 
by local authorities. Companies in the brand programme receive special 
attention and are regarded as 'key clients' by Sinosure. As such, the latter 
works out customized service offerings and treats the needs of brand 
companies with great care and on an individual basis. Furthermore, the 
insurer assists companies in establishing risk management systems and 
provides them with risk analyses on overseas target markets. As far as 
fees are concerned, Sinosure offers a special discount of 10 per cent on its 
regular fees for client companies assigned to it by central and provincial 
governments. Due to space restraints, it is not possible to elaborate further 
on the close relationship between Sinosure, the authorities and target 
companies. However, from this brief outline it is clear that Sinosure is 
tightly involved or even co-opted in a system aimed at supporting the 
ﬁrms selected for the Famous Brand Programme (MOFCOM and Sino-
sure 2005; MOFCOM and Jiangsu Province 2006).
Export tax credits
To attract foreign direct investment, China maintained separate en-
terprise income tax laws for foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) until 
2008. This allowed FIEs to beneﬁt from tax refunds contingent upon 
exports. The regulations encouraged exports by offering export-ori-
ented companies that reinvested their proﬁts to expand production in 
China a refund of the proportion of the enterprise income tax paid on 
the reinvested amount (WTO 2006). In a similar fashion, FIEs exporting 
more than 70 per cent of their annual production value were eligible for 
an enterprise income tax rate of 15 per cent, about half the regular rate. 
Furthermore, FIEs already enjoying a reduced tax rate, for example, due 
to their location in special economic zones or economic and technology 
development zones, were taxed at only 10 per cent. 12
Since foreign investment in the steel industry was tightly restricted 
and subject to a case-by-case approval process, Chinese authorities had 
a free hand in directing investment projects towards the high-value-
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added product segments. According to the Development Policy for the 
Iron and Steel Industry, promulgated in 2005, foreign investors had to 
possess advanced technological capabilities and their own intellectual 
property to receive approval (NDRC 2005). Consequently, with regard 
to the steel industry, the preferential tax arrangements for FIEs were 
limited to a relatively small group of companies engaged in technol-
ogy-intensive manufacturing.
Several Chinese provinces operate special export support funds al-
located in the provincial budget. All schemes identiﬁed in the course 
of the research for this paper are limited to companies registered inside 
the respective provinces, engage in the production of either high-value-
added products or technology-intensive products.
Liaoning Province launched an Export Development Support Fund 
in August 2001 (Liaoning Province 2001). The fund is supposed to help 
reach strategic export targets speciﬁed in the 10th Five-Year Plan of Li-
aoning Province and encourage local enterprises to further expand their 
export activities. All projects eligible for funding must stimulate export 
growth as well as strengthen and consolidate the position of Liaoning 
companies in international markets. Key products, key enterprises and 
goods from key regions are targeted. More precisely, funding projects 
should serve (1) to encourage the export of major 'backbone' products 
with a large impact on economic development, (2) to consolidate exist-
ing international market shares, (3) to defend and develop exports to 
important customers, (4) to encourage the formation of scale advantages 
in exports, and (5) to encourage the export of famous, high-quality and 
branded products. If all the conditions can be met, the participating 
company can receive a six-month loan (or a 12-month loan under certain 
conditions) with privileged conditions handed out through ﬁnancial 
institutions commissioned by the government.
To create export incentives, the government of Hunan Province 
handed out prizes based on export performance. These were awarded 
to local companies that registered exceptionally strong export growth 
in the preceding year. The programme was launched in 2005 and dis-
continued in 2008 (Hunan Province 2005).
Conclusion
The analysis of policies employed by Chinese authorities to inﬂuence 
the volume and composition of exports has conﬁrmed that trade policy 
is formulated to support the overarching industrial policy framework 
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aimed at developing and upgrading the steel industry. In 2010, the State 
Council demanded that regulations governing imports and exports of 
steel products be crafted to conform and contribute to several general 
objectives. Speciﬁcally, foreign trade policies should aim (1) to ensure 
sufﬁcient supplies to satisfy domestic demand, (2) to promote energy 
conservation and pollution reduction, (3) to control total production 
capacities, and (4) to help eliminate outdated, obsolete capacities 
(GOSC 2010).
While ample evidence was found for an active EP strategy, solid ref-
erences to IS policies have been elusive for much of the period under 
review. While government documents and state-sponsored industry 
associations spell out objectives for import substitution, this research 
did not locate concrete information on related support or enforcement 
mechanisms. The review of policy measures has suggested that this is 
the result of a fairly recent policy shift, since it was shown that China 
used to pursue a more balanced approach before 2001. IS industrializa-
tion had been practiced for many years before China's accession to the 
WTO, but most ofﬁcial programmes were phased out prior to 2001 or 
were scaled down to become practically irrelevant. Two reasons may be 
identiﬁed for this phenomenon. First, the general restrictions on trade 
policy and the additional obligations spelled out in China's accession 
agreement severely narrowed the policy space and called for far-reach-
ing cutbacks of state intervention. Second, and more importantly, the 
Chinese steel industry has expanded in terms of both quantity and 
quality to meet (and exceed) domestic demand in almost every product 
segment. The increase of self-sufﬁciency over the past decade suggests 
a waning need for IS. The pronounced emphasis on EP, which is given 
expression by a number of promotional schemes, can be interpreted as 
an attempt by policy makers to drive technological upgrading and im-
prove the international competitiveness of Chinese ﬁrms. This ﬁnding, 
to some extent, invalidates the idea that the abolition of IS was driven 
by China's WTO accession. 
Strong evidence was found to support the second hypothesis. Chi-
nese trade policy targeting steel products is clearly crafted in favour 
of high-value-added, technology-intensive product categories. During 
the review of trade policy measures aimed at restraining steel product 
exports–either directly by administrative order or indirectly by under-
mining their competitiveness on world markets–it has become clear 
that technology-intensive, ﬁnished products have been less affected. 
However, this has to take into account a gradual tightening of standards 
_________________________________________________________________________53
_______________________________________________ China's Trade in Steel Products
that has narrowed the range of products qualifying de facto as technol-
ogy-intensive. While practically all kinds of galvanized sheet or stainless 
sheet were considered high-value-added and technology-intensive ﬁve 
years ago, modern conceptions will grant this attribute only to wide 
diameter sheets while relegating narrow diameter products to mid-tech 
status. In 2008 and 2010, VAT rebates were lowered for certain narrow 
diameter galvanized sheet and stainless strip. 
Nevertheless, technological sophistication should not be regarded as 
the only guideline for product-sensitive export restrictions and promo-
tions. In 2009, as the steel industry and its export businesses were hit 
by the global economic downturn, government measures to ease export 
restraints also covered rather basic steel products, such as hot rolled 
strip. This suggests that changes of the macro environment also play 
a signiﬁcant role and can lead to a relaxing of the general dichotomy 
between more and less favourable treatment for high- and low-tech 
exports respectively. It is also conceivable that pressure from escalating 
trade disputes targeting Chinese exports of certain technology-inten-
sive products, such as various kinds of seamless and welded pipes, has 
contributed to a reduction in VAT rebates.
Drawing lessons from the case of the Chinese steel industry to aid 
development economists or political decision makers in other late in-
dustrializing countries is difﬁcult. While the Chinese steel sector was 
bound to practice IS for the better part of three decades in the pre-reform 
era, economic opening in late 1978 for the ﬁrst time provided decision 
makers with the opportunity to choose IS, EP or both. Since domestic 
steel demand far outstripped production capacities over the ﬁrst two 
decades of the post-reform era, an export-led strategy clearly was not in 
the best interest of national development. Practicing development-ori-
ented governance, successive leadership generations crafted industrial 
policies to ensure that domestic demand could be met. Safeguarding 
an ample supply for national development objectives consistently took 
precedence over commercial ambitions to expand exports.13 A key lesson 
to draw from this episode would be that development-minded govern-
ments should prioritize the domestic steel supply over exports, as long 
as domestic supply shortages persist.
Due to the continental dimensions of its national territory, its extraor-
dinarily large population and the relatively low level of development 
at the onset of reforms, steel market volumes have been immense. Fur-
thermore, thanks to 30 years of rapid and unabated economic growth, 
industrial planners for the steel industry were in the fortunate position 
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of not having to worry about how to expand markets. The combina-
tion of these two critical success factors implied that international 
trade would not need to take centre-stage as both static and dynamic 
advantages could be exploited from serving the home market alone. 
Putting developmental considerations above commercial ones, driving 
up exports across the board has not been as high a priority. This is a 
stark departure from the harsh realities confronting the much smaller 
and less populous developing Latin American countries. However, the 
unique dimensions of the Chinese steel market do not imply that its 
development does not hold lessons for other countries.
Logic has it that not even the Chinese steel industry can beneﬁt from 
high economic and demand growth indeﬁnitely. As steelmakers have 
greatly expanded their technological capabilities and advanced into 
more and more specialized product segments, it was realized that the 
domestic market is, in fact, too small and growing too slowly. For years, 
industrial policies and corporate strategies have aimed to upgrade tech-
nologies and ﬁll the few remaining white spots in product portfolios. 
The consequence was a torrent of ﬁxed asset investments which have 
led to the formation of overcapacities that have ﬁrst engulfed the lower 
rungs of the product spectrum but gradually went on to plague even 
some of the most sophisticated product categories, e.g. certain types 
of silicon steel. The urge of the Development Programme for the Iron 
and Steel Industry during the 12th Five-Year Programme, to crowd out 
imports and achieve self-sufﬁciency rates in excess of 90 per cent have 
to be understood in this context. However, the absence of evidence for 
concrete IS policies suggests that the opportunity costs of practicing 
IS have become prohibitively high. A return to the IS practices of the 
past would not be feasible for other developing countries, especially 
as many are beneﬁting from assistance programmes ﬁnanced by the 
United States, the European Union, the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, where trade protectionism is ruled out.
A major lesson that can be learned from the present case is that trade 
policy should be closely integrated into a general industrial policy 
framework. In the Chinese case, both have been mutually supportive 
with favourable outcomes. A second and related lesson pertains to 
product-speciﬁc policies, which have proven highly effective in the 
Chinese context. Here, it has become visible in the ﬁeld of export 
restrictions rather than promotion. Faced with a severe overcapacity 
crisis in the lower rungs of the steel market, the Chinese government 
has chosen to restrict exports and thus accelerate the necessary indus-
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try restructuring and consolidation. By bottling up raw materials and 
semi-ﬁnished products inside the home market, authorities indirectly 
lowered input costs of downstream processing industries and indi-
rectly subsidized their technological upgrading.
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NOTES
1 Dressed as an infant industry argument, IS approaches were at the core of Alexander 
Hamilton's Report on Manufactures to the US Congress in 1791 and Friedrich List's 
National System in 19th century Germany. Baer (1972) and Chang (2002) have argued 
that all of today's industrialized countries had IS episodes in their histories.
2 'National treatment' stipulates that imported and domestically produced goods 
must be treated equally. Discrimination against imports through non-tariff barriers 
is thus ruled out.
3 Amsden (2001) even argued that the productivity increases which underlie successful 
economic development in developing countries mainly originate from obtaining, 
understanding and applying advanced foreign technologies.
4 While the scope of this article is limited to the review and evaluation of industrial 
policy strategies targeting the steel industry, it should be pointed out that governing 
the latter should not be regarded as an end in itself. Instead, developing and guiding 
the steel industry may well be considered an intermediate objective, aimed at sup-
porting the strengthening of downstream industries. As a supplier of vital products 
to the newly deﬁned set of pillar industries, including renewable energy generation 
or new vehicle propulsion systems, the steel sector is set to play an important–if 
secondary–role over the coming ﬁve years until 2016 (NPC 2011).
5 The Chinese steel sector accounts for a relatively large share of employment, gross 
industrial output value and capital investments. Employment has oscillated around 
3 million formal employees between 1991 and 2011 and steel mills have gained 
importance as employers in the manufacturing sector, with the proportion of jobs 
increasing from 5.6 to 8.8 per cent over the same time. Key output indicators, such 
as gross industrial output value and value added, have also risen in recent years, 
with steel smelting and rolling accounting for 8 to 10 per cent of the manufacturing 
total sector in 2011 (NBS, various years).
6 The dramatic cutbacks in most other countries around the world certainly contrib-
uted to this situation.
7 In 2011, Japan and South Korea exported 38 and 42 per cent respectively (WSA 2012).
8 Imports in 2009–and to some extent also in 2008 and 2010–were elevated due to large 
inﬂows of steel products from South Korea, Russia and Ukraine. Under the inﬂu-
ence of the world economic crisis, the won, ruble and hryvnia have all depreciated 
relative to the Chinese yuan, strengthening the competitiveness of their respective 
steel products on the Chinese–and world–markets.
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9 Xinhua, 25 Dec. 2004. 'Model for the Reform of State-owned Enterprises–Tianjin 
Pipe Group: From Creating to Producing'. Available from: http://news.xinhuanet.
com/newscenter/2004-12/25/content_2378799.htm, accessed 4 May 2013.
10 In 2002, the former State Economic and Trade Commission, together with other 
central government agencies, announced that the 'Steel Import Substitution Policy' 
would be renamed the 'Special Steel for Processing Exports Policy'.
11 North America, the European Union, Japan, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and 
bonded areas inside China were explicitly excluded. An additional 10 per cent was 
granted for agricultural exports or exports of large-size electronic devices, ships or 
manufacturing equipment.
12 MOF, 1994, Detailed Implementation Rules of the Income Tax Law of the People's 
Republic of China of Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises.
13 In this respect, it is highly relevant that the bulk of steel production, albeit with a 
decreasing proportion, rested in the hands of state-owned companies. In fact, in 
2012 for the ﬁrst time in post-World War II history, the output of non-state-owned 
mills exceeded that of state-owned mills.
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TABLE 1: Degree of Self-sufﬁciency in Various Steel Product Categories (in %)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Railway steel products 96.33 98.12 94.89 95.48 96.17
Large sections 95.73 95.99 96.03 95.36 97.43
Small & medium sections 99.80 99.83 99.92 99.92 99.84
Bar products 99.05 98.98 99.46 99.37 99.35
Rebar 99.95 99.97 99.95 99.96 99.97
Wire rod 99.18 99.31 99.47 99.37 99.45
Super heavy plate 97.63 98.41 98.76 99.21 99.14
Medium plate 97.54 98.12 98.28 98.52 98.28
HR thin sheet/strip 95.54 96.64 91.58 97.43 98.59
CR thin sheet/strip 87.62 89.03 88.55 91.82 92.74
HR narrow strip 99.58 99.64 99.80 99.72 99.74
CR narrow strip 92.67 94.51 95.79 96.12 97.08
Coated/plated sheet/strip 74.19 77.26 84.56 84.76 87.83
Clad sheet 89.57 75.67 91.34 86.13 47.26
Silicon steel sheet/strip 79.11 80.40 84.05 85.07 86.27
Seamless tubes and pipes 96.50 96.22 98.16 98.84 98.82
Welded tubes 98.77 97.56 99.04 99.26 99.29
Steel products overall 96.75% 97.14% 97.43% 97.87% 98.16%
Note: HR = hot rolled, CR = cold rolled
Source: Shijing Weilai 2012 
APPENDIX
